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 In the mystery Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes draws the 
detective’s attention to the curious incident of the dog in the 
night-time. The detective reminds him that the dog did noth-
ing in the night-time. Holmes replies: That was the curious 
incident. The incident is an important clue to the mystery’s 
solution.
 We draw everyone’s attention to the curious incident of 
the capuchins. Beran et al. (in press) compared capuchins’ 
ability to make a perceptual response to middle stimuli and 
an uncertainty response to difficult stimuli. Capuchins com-
pleted a Sparse-Uncertain-Dense (SUD) task in which any 
trials of the monkeys’ choosing could be declined through 
an uncertainty response. The uncertainty response let them 
avoid difficult trials, avoid associated error timeouts, and 
greatly increase their reward efficiency. They also complet-
ed a Sparse-Middle-Dense (SMD) task in which correctly 
made middle responses to middle stimuli were rewarded. 
Capuchins used the middle response easily (Figure 1A) but 
not the uncertainty response (Figure 1B—see also Figure 6, 
Smith et al., present volume).
 That the capuchins showed almost no uncertainty re-
sponding in the SUD task yet used the middle response so 
perfectly in the SMD task is an important clue in developing 
a psychological theory of animals’ uncertainty responding. 
It points this new field toward the theoretical developments 
that will make its next phase rich and scientifically produc-
tive. This is why.
 You can’t explain the Middle-Uncertain dissociation by 
claiming that animals emit the behavior that is associated 
with the higher payoff. Then, capuchins would certainly 
have responded Uncertain for difficult stimuli so as to avoid 
timeouts.
 You also can’t explain it by having animals respond to 
minimize the average delay to reinforcement. That delay 
would have been sharply reduced by adaptively responding 
Uncertain on difficult trials to avoid the frequent timeouts.
 You can’t explain it using some overall-reinforcement-rate 
explanation. Capuchins lost thousands of seconds of time-
on-task through penalty timeouts by not responding Uncer-
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tain. Indeed, their potential gain from responding Uncertain 
was greater than their potential gain from responding Middle 
in the final experiment in Beran et al. (in press).
 In fact, you can’t explain it using any behavioral econom-
ics model. A mathematical model has no way to explain 
the profound psychological difference between the Middle 
and Uncertain tasks. Even if very different settings of re-
sponse-strength, sensitivity, and risk-tolerance parameters 
could cause the model to fit the data from the SUD and SMD 
tasks, this would leave unanswered the psychological reason 
why animals entered a radically different place in parameter 
space in performing the two tasks. It is important to realize 
that the mathematics in formal models are psychologically 
empty and indeterminate.
 You can’t explain the dissociation using a stimulus-re-
sponse or response-strength mechanism. The response ten-
dencies for Sparse and Dense would weaken identically go-
ing to the middle of the stimulus continuum, so that Middle 
and Uncertain responses would both have the greater/win-
ning response strength for those middle/uncertain trials.
 You can’t explain it using an environment-cue interpreta-
tion. The cue environments for the two tasks were essen-
tially identical, with exactly the same stimuli and subjective 
stimulus impressions ideally occasioning the two responses.
 You can’t explain it with a behavioral-cue interpretation 
or a response-competition interpretation. The Sparse-Dense 
conflict/competition would have been identical in the two 
cases, with the third responses equivalently available as de-
fault, avoidance responses.
 You can’t explain it by claiming that animals carry from 
task to task an inertial bias to move the joystick down (Crys-
tal & Foote, present volume). That would have led to the 
same data pattern across tasks, not a qualitative difference, 
because the middle and uncertainty responses were made in 
the identical manner. In our view, based on many collective 
years working with nonhuman primates, this inertial-bias 
claim carries no weight in any case. This is not what mon-
keys or apes do, any more than human subjects have a left-
response bias in an experiment because they turned left into 
the parking lot of the psychology building and left off the 
elevator to come to your office.
 Thus, the curious incident of the capuchins is construc-
tive in forcing the field beyond its emphasis on stimuli, re-
inforcement, conditioning processes, and response-strength 
gradients. If any of these sufficiently produced the uncer-
tainty data pattern, capuchins would have shown it, because 
there simply is no way in which the poor-person’s chimpan-
zee is associatively challenged, and because the SUD and 
SMD tasks were essentially controls for one another.
Figure 1. Mean percentage of sparse responses (blue dot-
ted line), dense responses (red dashed line), and uncertainty 
or middle responses (green solid line) by capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus apella) in Beran et al.’s Sparse-Middle-Dense task 
(A) and Sparse-Uncertain-Dense task (B). The results shown 
are from Beran et al.’s Experiment 2. The similar results from 
Beran et al.’s Experiment 1 were shown in Smith et al. (pres-
ent volume, Figure 6). From “The Psychological Organiza-
tion of ‘Uncertainty’ Responses and ‘Middle’ Responses: A 
Dissociation in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella),” by M. 
J. Beran, J. D. Smith, M. V. C. Coutinho, J. J. Couchman, 
and J. B. Boomer, 2009, Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Animal Behavior Processes, in press. Copyright 2009 
by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with 
permission.
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 Then how should we explain the dissociation? Probably 
capuchins used the Middle response appropriately because 
it is a perceptual response to a discrete stimulus class—just 
as the Sparse and Dense responses are. Probably capuchins 
did not use the Uncertain response because it is not grounded 
in a discrete stimulus class, because it is not like the Sparse 
and Dense responses, because it is structurally a second-or-
der response about the judged failure of the primary Sparse-
Dense discrimination. One already sees this qualitative task 
difference empirically in the Middle-Uncertain dissociation. 
Its explanation lies in the psychological difference between 
the tasks.
 Recent research with macaques reinforces the idea that the 
uncertainty response plays a distinctive role in psychophysi-
cal tasks and deserves a distinctive psychological interpreta-
tion. Macaques do not need trial-by-trial reinforcement to 
make adaptive uncertainty responses (Couchman et al., sub-
mitted; Smith et al., 2006) because uncertainty responses are 
decisional processes that are not dependent on reinforcement 
history and conditioning feedback. Macaques do not need 
their uncertainty responses to bring any immediate, tangi-
ble reward (Beran et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2006) because 
uncertainty—definitionally and psychologically—is not a 
reactive, reward-based phenomenon. Macaques spontane-
ously respond Uncertain on Trial 1 of new discriminations, 
but then not on Trial 2 after grasping the discrimination’s 
basis (Washburn et al., 2006). This result highlights the agil-
ity and flexibility of uncertainty responses that conditioned 
responses would never show. Finally, macaques respond un-
certain adaptively when facing abstract memory and rela-
tional-judgment problems (Hampton, 2001; Kornell et all, 
2005; Shields et al., 1997; Smith et al 1998). One sees from 
this that macaques can make difficulty assessments even 
about abstract and derived mental representations.
 Even the species difference between capuchins and ma-
caques reinforces the distinctive psychological interpretation 
that uncertainty responses deserve. Hampton (present vol-
ume) noted that capuchins seem to be on the outside looking 
in with regard to tests of animal metacognition (Basile et 
al., 2009; Call & Carpenter, 2001; Hampton et al., 2004). 
Despite being equal to or better than macaques at many tasks 
that allow for associative, learned response patterns, they 
seem unable to match the macaque in this domain. The obvi-
ous implication of these results is that uncertainty respond-
ing is not associative, or else the capuchins would show it. 
This is also the implication from the dissociation shown in 
Beran et al. (in press).
 Thus, many lines of evidence recommend focused re-
search to understand the distinctive psychological role of 
the uncertainty response in discrimination tasks. In a sense, 
this was also the recommendation of Josefowiez, Staddon, 
and Cerutti (present volume) who pointed out that the field 
could worry less about what is (not) metacognition and fo-
cus instead on the processes and representations that allow 
animals to respond adaptively to uncertainty in the referent 
tasks.
 Their suggestion is important, timely, and paradigm shift-
ing. This approach means letting go the grip of formal math-
ematics. The mathematics is psychologically silent, and it 
can block one from thinking psychologically about uncertain 
situations. It means letting go the grip of stimulus/reinforce-
ment, which are not applicable to recent uncertainty-moni-
toring findings and which do not explain task and species 
dissociations. It means focusing on uncertainty monitoring 
as a controlled process (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), an 
executive process, perhaps a conscious process. If we find 
the most illuminating psychological level of analysis, there 
will be many intriguing theoretical questions to consider. 
In our view, this is the pathway to the strongest theoretical 
advancement in this area, even though it means that we all 
will have to wrestle with our higher (cognitive) angels. We 
are optimistic about continued theoretical progress in this 
field, given the sharp interest in it and given the insightful 
comparative scientists exploring it whose work and contri-
butions we admire and respect.
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